Comments for DEAD MESSENGER http://deadmessenger.wordpress.com What's the message? Sat, 01 Dec 2007 18:11:04 +0000 http://wordpress.com/ hourly 1 Comment on Msg. Jan. 1, 2007; “Living On A Thin Line” by urantian http://deadmessenger.wordpress.com/2007/01/02/msg-jan-1-2007-living-on-a-thing-line/#comment-8 urantian Sat, 01 Dec 2007 18:11:04 +0000 http://deadmessenger.wordpress.com/2007/01/02/msg-jan-1-2007-living-on-a-thing-line/#comment-8 Like all you Hitler lovers, Hitler's notions and false science regarding pure race lines were completly erroneous. There are no "pure race" lines anymore; they were genetically blended thousands of years ago. Just a reminder, Hitler lost to the likes and intellect of Sir Winston Churchill. Doesn't say much for Hitler's thousand year 3rd Reich and "master race," does it? It is now possible to have your personal gnome origins researched and reported, for a fee. I think it's about $700. You might be surprised at the discovery of who was lurking in your ancestors wood pile. You obviously have a superiority complex. Don't get me wrong, I support voluntary and inteligent genetic selection. Although, I could never support it being enforced at end of a gun barrell. That, will never work. If you aren't too narrow minded and have the capacity to look at ideas you may not agree with it's possible you could learn something new and inspiring. I recommend you read the excerpt below. In fact, if you had the intellectual capacity, you might benefit from reading the entire book. However, after reviewing the tone, intellect and character of your comment, my hopes don't rise very high in that reagard. THE URANTIA BOOK PART III - THE HISTORY OF URANTIAPAPER 64 - THE EVOLUTIONARY RACES OF COLOR http://mercy.urantia.org/papers/paper64.html Like all you Hitler lovers, Hitler’s notions and false science regarding pure race lines were completly erroneous. There are no “pure race” lines anymore; they were genetically blended thousands of years ago. Just a reminder, Hitler lost to the likes and intellect of Sir Winston Churchill. Doesn’t say much for Hitler’s thousand year 3rd Reich and “master race,” does it?

It is now possible to have your personal gnome origins researched and reported, for a fee. I think it’s about $700. You might be surprised at the discovery of who was lurking in your ancestors wood pile. You obviously have a superiority complex.

Don’t get me wrong, I support voluntary and inteligent genetic selection. Although, I could never support it being enforced at end of a gun barrell. That, will never work.

If you aren’t too narrow minded and have the capacity to look at ideas you may not agree with it’s possible you could learn something new and inspiring. I recommend you read the excerpt below. In fact, if you had the intellectual capacity, you might benefit from reading the entire book. However, after reviewing the tone, intellect and character of your comment, my hopes don’t rise very high in that reagard.

THE URANTIA BOOK
PART III – THE HISTORY OF URANTIAPAPER 64 – THE EVOLUTIONARY RACES OF COLOR
http://mercy.urantia.org/papers/paper64.html

]]> Comment on Msg. Jan. 1, 2007; “Living On A Thin Line” by johann14 http://deadmessenger.wordpress.com/2007/01/02/msg-jan-1-2007-living-on-a-thing-line/#comment-7 johann14 Sat, 01 Dec 2007 17:34:17 +0000 http://deadmessenger.wordpress.com/2007/01/02/msg-jan-1-2007-living-on-a-thing-line/#comment-7 What idiotic Churchill worshippers like you don't realize is that Hitler was the last best hope for the White man. Do you think Arabs and niggers would be killing and raping throughout Europe if the Nazis were in charge? What idiotic Churchill worshippers like you don’t realize is that Hitler was the last best hope for the White man. Do you think Arabs and niggers would be killing and raping throughout Europe if the Nazis were in charge?

]]> Comment on Msg. Nov. 13, 2006; China Our Friend or Foe? by Msg. Aug. 26, 2007; “CHINA, Inc.-The Dragon’s Fire” « DEAD MESSENGER http://deadmessenger.wordpress.com/2006/11/14/21/#comment-5 Msg. Aug. 26, 2007; “CHINA, Inc.-The Dragon’s Fire” « DEAD MESSENGER Sun, 26 Aug 2007 16:01:28 +0000 http://deadmessenger.wordpress.com/2006/11/14/21/#comment-5 [...] satelites and shadowing Amrica’s pacific fleet with their new submarines (read my post Msg. Nov. 13, 2006; China Our Friend or Foe?). New [...] [...] satelites and shadowing Amrica’s pacific fleet with their new submarines (read my post Msg. Nov. 13, 2006; China Our Friend or Foe?). New [...]

]]> Comment on Msg. Oct 3, 2006; RE: Wimpy Rambos/Salon.com by urantian http://deadmessenger.wordpress.com/2006/10/28/msg-oct-3-2006-re-wimpy-rambossaloncom/#comment-3 urantian Thu, 16 Nov 2006 07:00:36 +0000 http://deadmessenger.wordpress.com/2006/10/28/msg-oct-3-2006-re-wimpy-rambossaloncom/#comment-3 This was such an excellent and informed analysis of the Defense Department pre and post invasion policy effecting the war in Iraq. I appreciated the former General's perspective and insight so much I felt it should be shared on this blog. Perhaps you'll agree? Dead Messenger Attached Message From: To: Subject: Gen Zais On US Strategy In Iraq . . . or Lack Thereof Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2006 12:08 PM I think that this Gen. Zais is the son of Gen. Mel Zais, with whom I served back in the 50's. It surely does sound like him. In any even, this guy is dead-on in my opinion. He doesn't offer a solution to the present problem in this piece, but he does explain it's birthing better than I have heard. Rummy has certainly torn up our Army, and I hope it will start to be repaired ---- SOONEST! Doug. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- From: President Sent: Thursday, November 09, 2006 11:12 AM To: Faculty; Staff Faculty and staff: A number of you have asked me for copies of my remarks today at the honors convocation. They are below. I will also ask Casey Banks to submit them to the Newberry Observer for publication. But it may be too long for them. We'll see. Mick Mitchell M. Zais, Ph.D. President, Newberry College 2100 College Street Newberry, SC 29108 803-321-5102 =================================== US Strategy in Iraq Honors Convocation Newberry College 9 November 2006 Mitchell Zais Many of our faculty and staff have asked me my views about the current situation in Iraq. A few students have also asked. So I thought I would take this opportunity, two days before Veterans' Day, to provide you with some insights as seen from the perspective of a combat veteran who served as the Commanding General of US and allied forces in Iraq. I also served as Chief of War Plans in the Pentagon and have spent considerable time studying national security affairs, including a fellowship at the National Defense University. So while it's true that everyone has opinions about Iraq, I would argue that not all of those opinions are equally well-informed. This talk will address our strategy in Iraq. I won't talk about what the next steps should be, what the long-term prospects for peace in Iraq are, or how we can best get out of the quagmire we are in. Those might be other talks. For today I'm going to focus on strategy Let me begin by saying that most of our problems in Iraq stem from a flawed strategy that has been in place since the beginning of the war. It's important that you understand what strategy is. In military terminology there is a distinction between strategy, operations, tactics, and techniques. Strategy pertains to national decision-making at the highest level. For example, our strategy in World War II was to mobilize the nation, then defeat the Nazi regime while conducting a holding action in the Pacific, then shift our forces to destroy the Japanese Empire. Afterwards, our strategy was to rebuild both defeated nations into capitalistic democracies in order to make them future allies. An example of an operational decision from World War II would be the decision to invade North Africa and then Italy and Southern France before moving directly for the heart of Germany by coming ashore in Northern France or Belgium. Tactics characterize a scheme of maneuver that integrates the different capabilities of, for example, infantry, armor, and artillery. A technique might describe a way of employing machine guns with overlapping fields of fire or of setting up a roadblock. Our strategy in Iraq has been: 1. fight the war on the cheap; 2. ask the ground forces to perform missions that are more suitably performed by other branches of the American government; 3. inconvenience the American people as little as possible, and 4. continue to fund the Air Force and Navy at the same levels that they have been funded at for the last 30 years while shortchanging the Army and Marines who are doing all of the fighting. No wonder the war is not going well. Let me explain how the war is being fought on the cheap. From the very beginning, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who thankfully announced his departure yesterday, has striven to minimize the number of soldiers and Marines in Iraq. Instead of employing the Colin Powell doctrine of "use massive force at the beginning to achieve a quick and decisive victory," his goal has been "use no more troops than absolutely necessary so we can spend defense dollars on new technology." Before hostilities began, the Army Chief of Staff, Eric Shinseki, testified before Congress that an occupation of Iraq would require hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Shinseki made his estimate based on his extensive experience in the former Yugoslavia where he worked to disengage the warring factions of Orthodox Serbians, Catholic Croatians, and Muslim Kosovars. Shinseki also had available the results of a wargame conducted in 1999 that involved 70 military, diplomatic, and intelligence officials. This recently declassified study concluded that 400,000 troops on the ground were needed to keep order, seal borders, and take care of other security needs. And even then stability would not be guaranteed. Because of his testimony before Congress, Rumsfeld moved Shinseki aside. In a nearly unprecedented move, to replace Shinseki, Rumsfeld recalled from active duty a retired general who was more likely to accept his theory that we could win a war in Iraq and establish a stable government with a small number of troops. The Defense Department has fought the war on the cheap because, despite overwhelming evidence that the Army and Marine Corps need a significant increase in their size in order to accomplished their assigned missions, the civilian officials who run the Pentagon have refused to request authorization from Congress to do so. Two Democratic representatives, Mark Udall from Colorado and Ellen Tauscher of California, have introduced a bill into Congress that would add 80,000 troops to the end-strength of the active Army. Currently, this bill has no support from the Defense Department. When I was commissioned in 1969 the Army was one and a half million. Despite the fact that we're engaged in combat in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in the Philippines, and committed to peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai, and on operational deployments in over 70 countries, our Army is now less than one third that size. We had more soldiers in Saudi Arabia in the first Gulf war than we have in the entire Army today. In fact, Wal-Mart has three times as many employees as the American Army has soldiers. As late as 1990, Army end-strength was approximately 770,000. With fewer than a half-million today, defense analysts have argued that we need to add nearly 200,000 soldiers to the active ranks. Today, the Army is so bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq that fewer than 10,000 soldiers are ready and able to deal with any new crisis elsewhere in the world. And because the Army is so small, after only a year at home units are returning to Iraq for a second and even a third 12-month tour of duty. Let me add a parenthetical note here explaining a difference between our services. Army tours of duty in Iraq are for 12 or 13 months. For Marines it's normally six months. For Air Force personnel it's typically four months. So when a soldier says he's going back to Iraq for his third tour, it means something totally different than when an airman says the same thing. Because the active force is too small, the mission of our National Guard and reserve forces has been changed. Their original purpose was to save the nation in time of peril. Today they serve as fillers for an inadequately sized active force. This change in mission has occurred with no national debate and no input from Congress. We have fought the war on the cheap because we have never adequately funded the rebuilding of the Iraqi military or the training and equipping of the Iraqi police forces. The e-mails I receive from soldiers and Marines assigned to train Iraqi forces all complain of their inadequate resources because they are at the very bottom of the supply chain and the lowest priority. We have fought the war on the cheap because we have failed to purchase necessary equipment for our troops or repair that which has been broken or a worn out in combat. You've all read the stories about soldiers having to purchase their own bulletproof vests and other equipment. And the Army Chief of Staff has testified that he needs an extra $17 billion to fix equipment. For example, nearly 1500 war-fighting vehicles await repair in Texas with 500 tanks sitting in Alabama. Finally, we are fighting this war on the cheap because our defense budget of 3.8% of gross domestic product is too small. In the Kennedy administration it averaged 9% of GDP. The average defense budget in the post Vietnam era, from 1974 to 1994, was about 5.8% of GDP. If we are in a global war against radical Islam, and we are, then we need a defense budget that reflects wartime requirements. A second part of our strategy is to ask the military to perform missions that are more appropriate for other branches of government. Our Army and Marine Corps are taking the lead in such projects as building roads and sewage treatment plants, establishing schools, training a neutral judiciary, and developing a modern banking system. The press refers to these activities as nation-building. Our soldiers and Marines are neither equipped nor trained to do these things. They attempt them, and in general they succeed, because they are so committed and so obedient. But it is not what they do well and what only they alone can do. But I would ask, where are our Department of Energy and Department of Transportation in restoring Iraqi infrastructure? What's the role of our Department of Education in rebuilding an Iraqi educational system? What does our Department of Justice do to help stand up an impartial judicial system? Where is the US Information Agency in establishing a modern equivalent of Radio Free Europe? And why did it take a year after the end of the active fighting for the State Department to assume responsibility from the Department of Defense in setting up an Iraqi government? These other US government agencies are only peripherally and secondarily involved in Iraq. Actually, it would be inaccurate to say that the American government is at war. The U.S. Army is at war. The Marine Corps is at war. And other small elements of our armed forces are at war. But our government is not. A third part of our strategy is to inconvenience the American people as little as possible. Ask yourself, are you at war? What tangible effect is this war having on your daily life? What sacrifices have you been asked to make for the sake of this war other than being inconvenienced at airports? No, America is not a war. Only a small number of young, brave, patriotic men and women, who bear the burden of fighting and dying, are at war. A fourth aspect of our strategy is to fund Navy and Air Force budgets at prewar levels while shortchanging the Marine Corps and the Army that are doing the fighting. This strategy, of spending billions on technology for a Navy and Air Force that face no threat, contributes mightily to our failures in Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld is a former Navy pilot. His view of the battlefield is from 10,000 feet, antiseptic and surgical. Since coming into office he has funded the Air Force and the Navy at the expense of the Army and Marines because he believes technological leaps we'll render ground forces obsolete. He assumed that the rapid victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan confirmed this belief. For example, the Defense Department is pouring billions into buying the newest fighter aircraft, at $360 million each, to take on a non-existent enemy Air Force. But, for pilots like Rumsfeld, war is all about technology. It's computers, it's radar, and it's high tech weapons. Technologists have a hard time comprehending the motivations of a suicide bomber or a mother who celebrates the death of her son in such a way. It's difficult for them to understand that to overcome centuries of ethnic hatred and murder it will take more than one generation. It's hard for them to accept that for young men with little education, no wives or children, and few job prospects, war against the West is the only thing that gives meaning to their lives. But war on the ground is not conducted with technology. It is fought by 25-year-old sergeants leading 19-year-old soldiers carrying rifles, in a dangerous and alien environment, where you can't tell combatants from noncombatants, Shiites from Sunnis, or suicide bombers from freedom seeking Iraqis. This means war on the street is neither antiseptic nor surgical. It's dirty, complicated, and fraught with confusion and error. In essence, our strategy has been produced by men whose view of war is based on their understanding of technology and machinery, not their knowledge of men from an alien culture and the forces which motivate them. They fail to appreciate that if you want to hold and pacify a hostile land and a hostile people you need soldiers and Marines on the ground and in the mud, and lots of them. In summary, our flawed strategy in Iraq has produced the situation we now face. This strategy is a product of the Pentagon, not the White House. And remember, the Pentagon is run by civilian appointees in suits, not military men and women in uniform. From the very beginning Defense Department officials failed to appreciate what it would take to win this war. The US military has tried to support this strategy because they are trained and instructed to be subordinate to and obedient to civilian leadership. And the American people want it that way. The last thing you want is a uniformed military accustomed to debating in public the orders of their appointed civilian masters. But retired generals and admirals are starting to speak out, to criticize the strategy that has produced our current situation in Iraq. But, if we continue to fight the war on the cheap, if we continue to avoid involving the American people by asking them to make any sacrifice at all, if we continue to spend our dollars on technology while neglecting the soldiers and Marines on the ground, and if we fail to involve the full scope of the American government in rebuilding Iraq, then we might as well quit, and come home. But, what we have now is not a real strategy - it's business as usual. -- Nick Experience is simply the name we give our mistakes. -- Oscar Wilde This was such an excellent and informed analysis of the Defense Department pre and post invasion policy effecting the war in Iraq. I appreciated the former General’s perspective and insight so much I felt it should be shared on this blog. Perhaps you’ll agree?
Dead Messenger
Attached Message
From:
To:
Subject:
Gen Zais On US Strategy In Iraq . . . or Lack Thereof
Date:
Mon, 13 Nov 2006 12:08 PM
I think that this Gen. Zais is the son of Gen. Mel Zais, with whom I served
back in the 50’s. It surely does sound like him. In any even, this guy is
dead-on in my opinion. He doesn’t offer a solution to the present problem in
this piece, but he does explain it’s birthing better than I have heard.
Rummy has certainly torn up our Army, and I hope it will start to be
repaired —- SOONEST! Doug.
—————————————————————————-
From: President
Sent: Thursday, November 09, 2006 11:12 AM
To: Faculty; Staff
Faculty and staff:
A number of you have asked me for copies of my remarks today at the
honors convocation. They are below. I will also ask Casey Banks to submit
them to the Newberry Observer for publication. But it may be too long for
them. We’ll see.
Mick
Mitchell M. Zais, Ph.D.
President, Newberry College
2100 College Street
Newberry, SC 29108
803-321-5102
===================================
US Strategy in Iraq
Honors Convocation
Newberry College
9 November 2006
Mitchell Zais
Many of our faculty and staff have asked me my views about the current
situation in Iraq. A few students have also asked. So I thought I would
take this opportunity, two days before Veterans’ Day, to provide you with
some insights as seen from the perspective of a combat veteran who served as
the Commanding General of US and allied forces in Iraq. I also served as
Chief of War Plans in the Pentagon and have spent considerable time studying
national security affairs, including a fellowship at the National Defense
University. So while it’s true that everyone has opinions about Iraq, I
would argue that not all of those opinions are equally well-informed.
This talk will address our strategy in Iraq. I won’t talk about what the
next steps should be, what the long-term prospects for peace in Iraq are, or
how we can best get out of the quagmire we are in. Those might be other
talks. For today I’m going to focus on strategy
Let me begin by saying that most of our problems in Iraq stem from a flawed
strategy that has been in place since the beginning of the war.
It’s important that you understand what strategy is. In military
terminology there is a distinction between strategy, operations, tactics,
and techniques.
Strategy pertains to national decision-making at the highest level. For
example, our strategy in World War II was to mobilize the nation, then
defeat the Nazi regime while conducting a holding action in the Pacific,
then shift our forces to destroy the Japanese Empire. Afterwards, our
strategy was to rebuild both defeated nations into capitalistic democracies
in order to make them future allies.
An example of an operational decision from World War II would be the
decision to invade North Africa and then Italy and Southern France before
moving directly for the heart of Germany by coming ashore in Northern France
or Belgium.
Tactics characterize a scheme of maneuver that integrates the different
capabilities of, for example, infantry, armor, and artillery.
A technique might describe a way of employing machine guns with overlapping
fields of fire or of setting up a roadblock.
Our strategy in Iraq has been:
1. fight the war on the cheap;
2. ask the ground forces to perform missions that are more suitably
performed by other branches of the American government;
3. inconvenience the American people as little as possible, and
4. continue to fund the Air Force and Navy at the same levels that they
have been funded at for the last 30 years while shortchanging the Army and
Marines who are doing all of the fighting.
No wonder the war is not going well.
Let me explain how the war is being fought on the cheap.
From the very beginning, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who thankfully
announced his departure yesterday, has striven to minimize the number of
soldiers and Marines in Iraq. Instead of employing the Colin Powell
doctrine of “use massive force at the beginning to achieve a quick and
decisive victory,” his goal has been “use no more troops than absolutely
necessary so we can spend defense dollars on new technology.”
Before hostilities began, the Army Chief of Staff, Eric Shinseki, testified
before Congress that an occupation of Iraq would require hundreds of
thousands of soldiers. Shinseki made his estimate based on his extensive
experience in the former Yugoslavia where he worked to disengage the warring
factions of Orthodox Serbians, Catholic Croatians, and Muslim Kosovars.
Shinseki also had available the results of a wargame conducted in
1999 that involved 70 military, diplomatic, and intelligence officials.
This recently declassified study concluded that 400,000 troops on the ground
were needed to keep order, seal borders, and take care of other security
needs. And even then stability would not be guaranteed.
Because of his testimony before Congress, Rumsfeld moved Shinseki aside. In
a nearly unprecedented move, to replace Shinseki, Rumsfeld recalled from
active duty a retired general who was more likely to accept his theory that
we could win a war in Iraq and establish a stable government with a small
number of troops.
The Defense Department has fought the war on the cheap because, despite
overwhelming evidence that the Army and Marine Corps need a significant
increase in their size in order to accomplished their assigned missions, the
civilian officials who run the Pentagon have refused to request
authorization from Congress to do so. Two Democratic representatives, Mark
Udall from Colorado and Ellen Tauscher of California, have introduced a bill
into Congress that would add 80,000 troops to the end-strength of the active
Army. Currently, this bill has no support from the Defense Department.
When I was commissioned in 1969 the Army was one and a half million.
Despite the fact that we’re engaged in combat in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in
the Philippines, and committed to peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Kosovo,
and the Sinai, and on operational deployments in over 70 countries, our Army
is now less than one third that size. We had more soldiers in Saudi Arabia
in the first Gulf war than we have in the entire Army today. In fact,
Wal-Mart has three times as many employees as the American Army has
soldiers.
As late as 1990, Army end-strength was approximately 770,000. With fewer
than a half-million today, defense analysts have argued that we need to add
nearly 200,000 soldiers to the active ranks.
Today, the Army is so bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq that fewer than
10,000 soldiers are ready and able to deal with any new crisis elsewhere in
the world. And because the Army is so small, after only a year at home
units are returning to Iraq for a second and even a third 12-month tour of
duty.
Let me add a parenthetical note here explaining a difference between
our services. Army tours of duty in Iraq are for 12 or 13 months. For
Marines it’s normally six months. For Air Force personnel it’s typically
four months. So when a soldier says he’s going back to Iraq for his third
tour, it means something totally different than when an airman says the same
thing.
Because the active force is too small, the mission of our National Guard and
reserve forces has been changed. Their original purpose was to save the
nation in time of peril. Today they serve as fillers for an inadequately
sized active force. This change in mission has occurred with no national
debate and no input from Congress.
We have fought the war on the cheap because we have never adequately funded
the rebuilding of the Iraqi military or the training and equipping of the
Iraqi police forces. The e-mails I receive from soldiers and Marines
assigned to train Iraqi forces all complain of their inadequate resources
because they are at the very bottom of the supply chain and the lowest
priority.
We have fought the war on the cheap because we have failed to purchase
necessary equipment for our troops or repair that which has been broken or a
worn out in combat. You’ve all read the stories about soldiers having to
purchase their own bulletproof vests and other equipment. And the Army
Chief of Staff has testified that he needs an extra $17 billion to fix
equipment. For example, nearly 1500 war-fighting vehicles await repair in
Texas with 500 tanks sitting in Alabama.
Finally, we are fighting this war on the cheap because our defense
budget of 3.8% of gross domestic product is too small. In the Kennedy
administration it averaged 9% of GDP. The average defense budget in the
post Vietnam era, from 1974 to 1994, was about 5.8% of GDP. If we are in a
global war against radical Islam, and we are, then we need a defense budget
that reflects wartime requirements.
A second part of our strategy is to ask the military to perform missions
that are more appropriate for other branches of government.
Our Army and Marine Corps are taking the lead in such projects as building
roads and sewage treatment plants, establishing schools, training a neutral
judiciary, and developing a modern banking system. The press refers to
these activities as nation-building. Our soldiers and Marines are neither
equipped nor trained to do these things. They attempt them, and in general
they succeed, because they are so committed and so obedient. But it is not
what they do well and what only they alone can do.
But I would ask, where are our Department of Energy and Department of
Transportation in restoring Iraqi infrastructure? What’s the role of our
Department of Education in rebuilding an Iraqi educational system? What
does our Department of Justice do to help stand up an impartial judicial
system? Where is the US Information Agency in establishing a modern
equivalent of Radio Free Europe? And why did it take a year after the end
of the active fighting for the State Department to assume responsibility
from the Department of Defense in setting up an Iraqi government? These
other US government agencies are only peripherally and secondarily involved
in Iraq.
Actually, it would be inaccurate to say that the American government is at
war. The U.S. Army is at war. The Marine Corps is at war. And other small
elements of our armed forces are at war. But our government is not.
A third part of our strategy is to inconvenience the American people as
little as possible.
Ask yourself, are you at war? What tangible effect is this war having on
your daily life? What sacrifices have you been asked to make for the sake
of this war other than being inconvenienced at airports? No, America is not
a war. Only a small number of young, brave, patriotic men and women, who
bear the burden of fighting and dying, are at war.
A fourth aspect of our strategy is to fund Navy and Air Force budgets at
prewar levels while shortchanging the Marine Corps and the Army that are
doing the fighting.
This strategy, of spending billions on technology for a Navy and Air Force
that face no threat, contributes mightily to our failures in Iraq.
Secretary Rumsfeld is a former Navy pilot. His view of the battlefield is
from 10,000 feet, antiseptic and surgical. Since coming into office he has
funded the Air Force and the Navy at the expense of the Army and Marines
because he believes technological leaps we’ll render ground forces obsolete.
He assumed that the rapid victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan confirmed
this belief.
For example, the Defense Department is pouring billions into buying the
newest fighter aircraft, at $360 million each, to take on a non-existent
enemy Air Force.
But, for pilots like Rumsfeld, war is all about technology. It’s computers,
it’s radar, and it’s high tech weapons. Technologists have a hard time
comprehending the motivations of a suicide bomber or a mother who celebrates
the death of her son in such a way. It’s difficult for them to understand
that to overcome centuries of ethnic hatred and murder it will take more
than one generation. It’s hard for them to accept that for young men with
little education, no wives or children, and few job prospects, war against
the West is the only thing that gives meaning to their lives.
But war on the ground is not conducted with technology. It is fought by
25-year-old sergeants leading 19-year-old soldiers carrying rifles, in a
dangerous and alien environment, where you can’t tell combatants from
noncombatants, Shiites from Sunnis, or suicide bombers from freedom seeking
Iraqis. This means war on the street is neither antiseptic nor surgical.
It’s dirty, complicated, and fraught with confusion and error.
In essence, our strategy has been produced by men whose view of war
is based on their understanding of technology and machinery, not their
knowledge of men from an alien culture and the forces which motivate them.
They fail to appreciate that if you want to hold and pacify a hostile land
and a hostile people you need soldiers and Marines on the ground and in the
mud, and lots of them.
In summary, our flawed strategy in Iraq has produced the situation
we now face. This strategy is a product of the Pentagon, not the White
House. And remember, the Pentagon is run by civilian appointees in suits,
not military men and women in uniform. From the very beginning Defense
Department officials failed to appreciate what it would take to win this
war.
The US military has tried to support this strategy because they are trained
and instructed to be subordinate to and obedient to civilian leadership.
And the American people want it that way. The last thing you want is a
uniformed military accustomed to debating in public the orders of their
appointed civilian masters. But retired generals and admirals are starting
to speak out, to criticize the strategy that has produced our current
situation in Iraq.
But, if we continue to fight the war on the cheap, if we continue to
avoid involving the American people by asking them to make any sacrifice at
all, if we continue to spend our dollars on technology while neglecting the
soldiers and Marines on the ground, and if we fail to involve the full scope
of the American government in rebuilding Iraq, then we might as well quit,
and come home. But, what we have now is not a real strategy – it’s business
as usual.
–
Nick
Experience is simply the name we give our mistakes.
— Oscar Wilde

]]> Comment on Msg. Nov. 12, 2006; Dear Terrorist,… by urantian http://deadmessenger.wordpress.com/2006/11/12/msg-nov-12-2006-dear-terrorist/#comment-2 urantian Wed, 15 Nov 2006 00:33:30 +0000 http://deadmessenger.wordpress.com/2006/11/12/msg-nov-12-2006-dear-terrorist/#comment-2 My such fire and passion... and we appreciate having an educated and > expressive "watchdog" keeping us up to date on the doings of the > radical Muslims ... thanks... uh, one suggestion... use your > spellchecker... lvu.. Muti It isn't so much a matter of passion as it is psychological warfare; counter propaganda. As you'll notice, if you read their blog, they're singing to the choir. There is no voice of desent, debate, or doubt allowed in their circles of discussion and thought. They don't question the rightousness of their mission. They are conditioning and programming the minds of their youth. They have gleefully commented about and posted links to all the snuff video and premeditated murders of American soldiers that were broadcast by "Al Jihadzera" and others. The comments I posted have been removed without comment from the blog twice by the blog's manager, Samir. I put it back up again today.... and I see that he has removed it a third time. I don't think he liked my comments. That's ok, I told him he is a coward and that I had the satisfaction of knowing that he would always be haunted by my words, which I repeated. If I can sow one inkling of self doubt or his question about the infalibility of their doctrine, I will have accomplished my goal. That scum needs to know we are listening to them and we fully understand what they are all about. If you read their text closely you'll see, they think they're very sneaky and clever. They use alot of muslim language code words in an attempt to conceal their endorsment and desire to see us murdered by their "brothers" and "sisters." Its their equivilant of a "wink" that implies "[we'll get them (the evil kifir) while they're sleeping and distracted by all their sinful activities]." I'll try to get to that spell checker more often. Thanks for the reminder. I don't want to appear icnorant... We need a nation of watchdogs! Where's your local Mosque? From there, just "follow the money." Of course it really doesn't matter as much now; that we identify Saudi Arabian Wahabist and Iranian Shite funding American Muslim Mosques. We pretty much know who the sponsors are. The problem we face now is home grown terrorist ala France and England. That is the nature of the battle we face here and now. An idea is the most powerful thing on earth. For example, Ayatollah Kohmeni exported his successful campaign to establish a radical Islamic Republic in Iran while he lived (for years in exile) in France. He spread his message and strategy using sophisticated and modern communications technology; by distributing casette tapes. He circulated the tapes to his supporters and the impoverished and disadvantaged population of Iran culminating in a violent revolt and seizure of the U.S. Embassy and Iranian capital in Tehran. And, he did it all without ever stepping foot on Iranian soil, subsequent to his exile. Personally, I would like to see our military or civilian government sponsor a counter propaganda campaign to radical Islam. I want a sustained campaign that employs all forms of mass communication in this country. It would be an excellent jobs program to! We could hire the best brodcasters, graphic artists, video engineers, web gurus, etc.; just like CNN (only without their media bias). Hey, maybe we could outsource it to Pakistani or Inidan white collar laborers to save money!! ;) But, the ACLU and the brain washed secular progressives, multi-cultural racists, and bleeding heart liberals would rather see a nuke go off here before that happens. So, I see my humble anti-propaganda as a small, perhaps insignificant, way I can contribute to any effort to stop these madmen. I'm determined they won't chop off the head of anyone I know without a fight! They think they can sneak their ideology into our country over a protracted period of time in an effort to undermine, destablize, defeat and then physically dominate our government and civil society. You'll see me on the six o'clock news before that happens! My such fire and passion… and we appreciate having an educated and
> expressive “watchdog” keeping us up to date on the doings of the
> radical Muslims … thanks… uh, one suggestion… use your
> spellchecker… lvu.. Muti
It isn’t so much a matter of passion as it is psychological warfare; counter propaganda. As you’ll notice, if you read their blog, they’re singing to the choir. There is no voice of desent, debate, or doubt allowed in their circles of discussion and thought. They don’t question the rightousness of their mission. They are conditioning and programming the minds of their youth. They have gleefully commented about and posted links to all the snuff video and premeditated murders of American soldiers that were broadcast by “Al Jihadzera” and others.
The comments I posted have been removed without comment from the blog twice by the blog’s manager, Samir. I put it back up again today…. and I see that he has removed it a third time. I don’t think he liked my comments.
That’s ok, I told him he is a coward and that I had the satisfaction of knowing that he would always be haunted by my words, which I repeated. If I can sow one inkling of self doubt or his question about the infalibility of their doctrine, I will have accomplished my goal. That scum needs to know we are listening to them and we fully understand what they are all about.
If you read their text closely you’ll see, they think they’re very sneaky and clever. They use alot of muslim language code words in an attempt to conceal their endorsment and desire to see us murdered by their “brothers” and “sisters.” Its their equivilant of a “wink” that implies “[we'll get them (the evil kifir) while they're sleeping and distracted by all their sinful activities].”
I’ll try to get to that spell checker more often. Thanks for the reminder. I don’t want to appear icnorant…
We need a nation of watchdogs! Where’s your local Mosque? From there, just “follow the money.” Of course it really doesn’t matter as much now; that we identify Saudi Arabian Wahabist and Iranian Shite funding American Muslim Mosques. We pretty much know who the sponsors are. The problem we face now is home grown terrorist ala France and England.
That is the nature of the battle we face here and now. An idea is the most powerful thing on earth. For example, Ayatollah Kohmeni exported his successful campaign to establish a radical Islamic Republic in Iran while he lived (for years in exile) in France. He spread his message and strategy using sophisticated and modern communications technology; by distributing casette tapes. He circulated the tapes to his supporters and the impoverished and disadvantaged population of Iran culminating in a violent revolt and seizure of the U.S. Embassy and Iranian capital in Tehran. And, he did it all without ever stepping foot on Iranian soil, subsequent to his exile.
Personally, I would like to see our military or civilian government sponsor a counter propaganda campaign to radical Islam. I want a sustained campaign that employs all forms of mass communication in this country. It would be an excellent jobs program to! We could hire the best brodcasters, graphic artists, video engineers, web gurus, etc.; just like CNN (only without their media bias). Hey, maybe we could outsource it to Pakistani or Inidan white collar laborers to save money!! ;) But, the ACLU and the brain washed secular progressives, multi-cultural racists, and bleeding heart liberals would rather see a nuke go off here before that happens.
So, I see my humble anti-propaganda as a small, perhaps insignificant, way I can contribute to any effort to stop these madmen. I’m determined they won’t chop off the head of anyone I know without a fight! They think they can sneak their ideology into our country over a protracted period of time in an effort to undermine, destablize, defeat and then physically dominate our government and civil society. You’ll see me on the six o’clock news before that happens!

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